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Similarly, Article 42 of the 1938 Italian Law of War (still in force) prohibits bombardments the only aim of which is to hit the civilian population or to destroy or damage to non-military related property. 22 On 19 December 1969, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 2444 by unanimous vote, which expressly recognizes the principle of civilian immunity and its complementary principle requiring the warring parties to distinguish civilians from combatants at all times. 23 The United States acknowledged that the resolution, which does not distinguish between different kinds of warfare and therefore also applies to aerial bombardment, is declaratory of customary law. 24 During the 1991 Gulf War, Colin Powell, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, declared that the provisions of Protocol I had been applied since they constituted customary law and that the principle of distinction was respected by US armed forces. 22 Legge italiana di guerra, approved by Royal Decree no. 1415 of 8 July 1938. 23 The preamble to this resolution states that these fundamental humanitarian law principles apply 'in all armed conflicts', meaning both international and internal. The UN Security Council also declared that the deliberate targeting of civilians in armed conflict is a threat to international peace and security and triggers Council action (resolution 1296/2000). 24 1976 USAF Pamphlet 5-7. 25 although NATO had made some mistakes, it never intentionally targeted civilians.
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Iraqi and Yugoslavian complaints about attacks on civilians by the United States and its allies also confirm the existence of an opinio juris on the binding character of the principle of distinction, although the two countries did not eventually respect such principle. Finally, the principle of distinction has also been firmly upheld by national and international courts: in particular, according to the 1996 International Court of Justice (ICJ)'s Advisory Opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the obligation to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants is one of the cardinal principles of humanitarian law and is to be observed by all States whether or not they have ratified the conventions that contain it. 29 According to the ICTY, 'it is now a universally recognised principle … that deliberate attacks on civilians or civilian objects are absolutely prohibited by international humanitarian law'.
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Contemporary air warfare, however, has developed some features that the existing rules do not take expressly into account. To start with, doubts can be raised about the lawfulness of US aircraft flying at 15,000 feet to minimize risks of being shot down by the Serb anti-aircraft artillery during the Kosovo war: 31 at that height, pilots were unable to have visual confirmation of the nature of the target, or that civilians had not moved into the area. 32 At least some bombardments by American aircraft during Operation
Enduring Freedom were carried out from above 30,000 feet where anti-aircraft artillery and Stinger missiles could not reach them. 33 In Afghanistan, the United States also employed an unmanned aerial vehicle, which was reported to have unintentionally hit people: however, the principle of distinction requires that '[t]here must be some human being, even if he is geographically removed from the target, who obtains information in . 32 This happened, for instance, in the case of the Grdelica Gorge bridge (12 April 1999), which was bombed while a civilian passenger train was transiting on it. The pilot was able to see the target only on a tiny screen. Again, a convoy of Albanian refugees was bombed on 14 April 1999 by NATO aircraft on the Djakovica-Prizren road, killing about 70-75 people (Amnesty International above n 26 at 37-40). The NATO aircraft was flying at 15,000 feet and, viewed with the naked eye, the vehicles seemed military. According to the ICTY Final Report, though, 'there is nothing inherently unlawful about flying above the height which can be reached by enemy air defences' and 'neither the aircrew nor the commanders displayed the degree of recklessness in failing to take precautionary measures which would sustain criminal charges' (paras 56, 70) . 33 Keesing's Contemporary Archives (2001) 44392.
real-time and decides whether or not the target is legitimate'. 34 The same can be said about night bombing, if this makes impossible for the pilot to comply with the principle of distinction and with Article 51 (4) (c) of Additional Protocol I, which reflects customary law. 35 Thus, in case of risks for civilians, the attack should be carried out in daylight, evaluating the dangers for pilots against the possible military advantage to be gained by the operation. 36 The US practice of prioritising the protection of its own combatants with respect to the enemy's civilians in order not to lose the support of the public opinion also erodes the principle of proportionality embodied in Article 51 (5) (b) and violates Article 57 (2) of Additional Protocol I, which provides for the attacker's obligation to take all reasonable precautions to avoid loss of civilians and damage to civilian property (this provision is considered customary by the United States 37 and by the ICTY 38 ). The Europeans seem to have adopted a stricter, more correct position.
According to the 1996 British defence doctrine, 'there may be occasions when a commander will have to accept a higher level of risk to his own forces in order to avoid or reduce collateral damage to the enemy's civil population', 39 while the German Joint Services Regulations forbid bombardments which cannot be directed at a specific military objective (para 455) and obliges military leaders to 'choose means and methods minimizing incidental injury and damage to civilian life and objects' (para 457). It is worth noting that, in the second half of Operation Allied Force, NATO changed its rules of engagement to allow planes fly as low as 6,000 feet and to require visual confirmation of the nature of the target, 40 According to Article 50 (3) of Additional Protocol I, 'the presence within the civilian population of individuals who do not come within the definition of civilians does not deprive the population of its civilian character'. In Kosovo, NATO forces attacked a large convoy of vehicles southeast of Djakovica. After verifying the target again, it was established that there were civilian vehicles intermingled with the military ones, and the attack was immediately suspended. 42 On the contrary, the village of Koriša was bombed on 13 May 1999, causing 87 deaths among Albanian civilians, since it was believed that Serbian forces had established their headquarters there, in a block of residential apartments. 43 However, NATO insisted that an intended legitimate target had been hit and that there was no knowledge of the presence of civilians. One can also question the legitimacy of the US policy to target some residential areas in Afghanistan: according to the Pentagon, the targets were legitimate because they 'housed Taliban and al-Qaeda leadership'. 44 On 20 December 2001, the US bombed a convoy in the Paktia province because it was supposed to carry Taliban leaders and because a US aircraft had been fired upon by anti-aircraft missiles launched from it, but, according to other sources, the convoy was taking tribal elders to the inauguration of the new Karzai government. A village nearby was also bombed, because the convoy stopped in front of it, trying to leave the valley by another road. The Pentagon declared that the area was an active staging and coordinating base for Al-Qaeda activities and preparations for escape from Afghanistan, 45 and that there was absolute intelligence that the convoy hosted terrorists. 46 The death toll ranged from 15-65, all allegations being denied by US officials. felt over a lengthy period of time and affect military action in areas other than the vicinity of the target itself', then 'this meaning is included in the existing wording of Additional Protocol I' and 'the inclusion of the word "overall" is redundant'.
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However that may be, for States parties to Additional Protocol I, in order that an object may be considered a military objective and therefore be attacked without violating the principle of distinction, two cumulative elements must be present at the same time: it must effectively contribute to the military operations, or, at least, be about to do it, and it must offer a definite military advantage. In fact, there may be objectives which are lawful per se, but the destruction of which does not offer a military advantage. 90 Article 52 (2) provides for the criteria to evaluate whether the object complies with the first requirement: in particular, one has to take into account its nature, location, purpose or use (in this case, the concurrence is alternative legitimate when used to divert the attention of enemy troops to some location other than the eventual target of the allies' principal attack. Apart from defining the notion of military objective, the Protocol puts some objects under special protection, namely works and installations containing dangerous forces (dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations), the natural environment, objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, cultural objects and places of worship. The following pages will examine other targets which are not expressly dealt with by the Protocol but which have been frequently attacked in the most recent conflicts involving the use of air power.
Broadcasting facilities. Communication nodes have been a high priority in all recent armed conflicts. Media and broadcasting systems were included in the target list both in Operation Desert Storm and in Operation Allied Force. 94 On 23 April 1999, NATO aircraft intentionally bombed the headquarters of the RTS in Belgrade, killing between 10 and 17 civilians. 95 According to the Organization, it was a lawful target, since the station was used for military purposes, as part of the control mechanism and of the propaganda machinery. 96 The fact that the station was reactivated after a few hours and was not reattacked could be a sign that there was no military advantage gained from its destruction. The ICTY Final Report, however, concluded that the building was a troops in the field. According to the German Joint Services Regulations, military objectives by nature are particularly armed forces, military aircraft and warships, buildings and objects for combat service support and commercial objects, which make an effective contribution to military action (para 443). 92 The evalutation has to be made 'in the circumstances ruling at the time', thus ruling out any potential future advantage. However, this also implies that an objective which could not be normally considered as military such as a school may become such if it is used in direct support of the hostilities (for instance, hosting soldiers): see the case of the Basra college of literature, mentioned in APV Rogers above n 58 at 82. 133 The US statements are contradictory on this topic. According to a Pentagon source, 'it was impossible … to destroy the electrical power supply for Iraqi command and control facilities or chemical weapons factories, yet leave untouched that portion of the electricity supplied to the general populace' (quoted in CJ Greenwood above n 12 at 74). However, General Schwarzkopf declared: '[b]ecause of our interests in making sure that civilians did not suffer unduly, we felt we had to leave some of the electrical power in effect, and we've done that' (quoted in JW Crawford above n 131 at 118). 134 JW Crawford above n 131 at 108-109. 135 According to MW Lewis, such attacks were due to a lack of communication between the leadership, who wanted to minimize long-term damage to the Iraqi infrastructure, and the weapons officers, who followed their targeting handbook and thus targeted generator halls instead of transformers and switching yards (above n 69 at 505-506 attacks were directed at power distribution facilities instead of generation facilities, and they were carried out with carbon fiber bombs. 137 Electricity and water supplies in Basra and al-Nasiriyya were cut off by US/UK attacks. 138 Power and water supplies were also interrupted in Baghdad, because of -according to some allegations -a 'black-out bomb', although the Coalition denied responsibility. 139 However, the electricity network was largely left undamaged, probably in order to facilitate the post-war reconstruction. If the electric power plant is located at or in the vicinity of an installation containing dangerous forces such a dam or a dyke, States parties to Additional Protocol I should also apply Article 56. Therefore, the plant could be bombed only if it is used in regular, significant and direct support of military operations and the attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support, or if the action does not cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population. 140 At 5-9. Bridges and airfield are also included in the list of military objectives contained in the Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations para 8.1.1. 141 In particular, the bridges on the Euphrate and the Danube rivers were attacked. According to the Pentagon Final Report, bridges on the former were destroyed because they contained the multiple-fiber optic links that provided Saddam Hussein with secure communications to his southern group of forces (C Greenwood above n 12 at 74). In Yugoslavia, more than 20 road and rail bridges were damaged or destroyed and some roads and all railway lines to Kosovo were interrupted, in order to hinder the movement of Serb forces (House of Commons above n 62 at 26). 142 destruction of a bridge is of fundamental importance for the occupation of a strategic zone, it is legitimate that some houses may be hit. Moreover, before attacking a bridge or road which is used both by civilians and the military, the attacker should determine whether there are alternative targets the destruction of which offers a similar military advantage but less risk to civilians, or whether there is a time of the day that would reduce potential harm (see, eg, the NATO attack on the Grdelica Gorge railroad bridge, which took place in the middle of the day, when a civilian passenger train was crossing it, or on the Luzane bridge, which was regularly used by civilian traffic but yet attacked during the day, or again on the Varvarin bridge, which was attacked during a religious holiday, when the streets were busier than usual 154 ). . 164 In this case, the principle of proportionality has to be taken into account. The most recent armed conflicts have showed a growing attention towards the need to avoid civilian casualties, mostly because of the fear of a public relation disaster. This eagerness to avoid high levels of civilian casualties was a key feature of all major war operations conducted by the United States since the 1991 Gulf War, and was particularly emphasized in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom. 165 In Operation Iraqi Freedom, lawyers constantly advised the UK and US military and political leaders on which targets could be hit, identifying legitimate target throughout the enemy's territory and evaluating the risk of collateral damage: when the risk was too high, the targets were set aside or mitigated. 2002 Joint Doctrine for Targeting (at A-1). 168 The customary status of the principle of proportionality as expressed by Additional Protocol I has also been acknowledged by the ICTY in the above mentioned Kupreškić judgment. 169 If the status of the principle of proportionality is undisputed, its application to concrete situations is problematic, especially in air warfare, where the armed forces of the attacker could return home with zero casualties, while the attacked belligerent with less advanced technology could sustain heavy losses (as happened in Kosovo). As noted, '[t]he intellectual process of balancing the various elements is so complicated, needs to take into account such a huge amount of data and so many factors, that any attempt to design a formula which is both comprehensive and precise would be ridiculous'. 170 This is because the two elements to be balanced against each other (the military advantage and the civilian losses) are heterogeneous. The evaluation has to be made on a case-by-case basis, taking the context into account under an honest and reasonable bona fide appraisal of the information available to the responsible person at the relevant time, and not on the basis of the hindsight. 171 For instance, the principle of proportionality would tolerate a higher level of collateral damage if the attack concerned civilians working in a weapon factory, while it should be interpreted strictly if among the civilians at risk there were women and children, 172 or if the targets were objects mainly used by the civilian population in an urban area.
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In the Kupreškić judgment, the ICTY argued that 'in case of repeated attacks, all or most of them falling within the grey area between indisputable legality and unlawfulness, it might be warranted to conclude that the cumulative effect of such acts entails that they may not be in keeping with international law. Indeed, this pattern of military conduct may turn out to jeopardise excessively the lives and assets of civilians, contrary to the demands of humanity'. 174 According to the ICTY Final Report, however, this statement must be interpreted as referring to 'an overall assessment of the totality of civilian victims as against the goals of the military campaign', since 'the mere cumulation of such instances, all of which are deemed to have been lawful, cannot ipso facto be said to amount to a crime' (para 52). This interpretation is consistent with the reservations issued, inter alia, by Italy, Australia, New Zealand, Belgium, Canada, Spain, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom when signing and/or ratifying the Protocol, according to which the military advantage has to be estimated with regard to the operation as a whole, and not to the single action itself or to the entire war.
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The principle of proportionality has also to be interpreted in the light of the evolving military, political and technological situation. In the following pages, this article will examine some recent trends which might transform the notion of how much collateral damage is proportional. To begin with, in the 1991 Gulf War, long-term civilian casualties resulting from starvation and diseases or damage to the living environment were not taken into account as part of the proportionality equation. 176 This practice seems to have changed. In the Kosovo conflict, transformer and distribution facilities were specifically targeted so as to avoid long-term impact on the civilian population. For the first time, the US employed graphite bombs to cut off Serbia electric power system without destroying infrastructures. 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE SELECTION OF TARGETS
Environmental considerations can have a double relevance in target selection.
First of all, the natural environment might be targeted as such, although this has not frequently happened in recent armed conflicts. A well-known example is the defoliation and killing by the Americans of inland and mangrove in South Vietnam in order to deny cover to Vietkong (1962 Vietkong ( -1971 200 and this has pushed some authors to exclude that the provisions in question might apply to operations (such an air bombardment) in a conventional war. 201 This interpretation cannot be shared: widespread, long-term and severe damages might be the consequence of the use of depleted uranium munitions, or of the bombing and subsequent destruction of oil rigs in enclosed or semi-enclosed sea, as happened during the Iran-Iraq war. 202 An area might also be rendered useless for decades because of live shells (eg, the unexploded bomblets of cluster bombs 203 ). As to the above mentioned bombing by NATO of the Pančevo and Zastava industrial complexes, the harmful consequences on the Danube and Morava Rivers and the surrounding environment could surely be 'severe' and 'widespread', but probably not 'long-term', if this requirement implies decades. This is also the conclusion of the ICTY Final Report, according to which the environmental damage caused during the bombardments did not reach the Additional Protocol I threshold.
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In any case -as noted by a commentator -the implementation of the environmental provisions of Protocol I might lead to paradoxical results. For instance, if a nuclear facility which is located in an uninhabited region were producing nuclear weapons to be used against the enemy, this could bomb and destroy it without breaching the principle of proportionality. However, the attack would probably violate Articles 35 (3) and 55 (1), although it would save thousands of lives (those potentially killed by the nuclear weapons produced in the facility). for instance, the development of a satellite system which determines the accurate position of the target so that the weapon can be dropped in all weather conditions even without seeing the ground, and the increasing use of precision-guided weapons have marked a far cry from the 1990-1991 Gulf War. 213 Paradoxically, though, the overwhelming military supremacy of one power (the United States) could undermine the principle of distinction, since the enemy, having nothing to lose and facing total defeat, might be led to desperately use all available methods and means, unlawful ones included. The principle of distinction is also weakened by some methods of warfare often employed in recent conflicts, such as night bombing and flying at high altitude, and by the use of civilians performing military or military related functions throughout the operations. As far as the principle of proportionality is concerned, the balance between collateral damage and military advantage gained from the operation should nowadays also take into account the long-term casualties of the attack (ie, those deriving from starvation or diseases or from unexploded weapons such as cluster bombs) and the damage to the natural environment. On the other hand, it is not possible to share the opinion that applies a stricter standard in the proportionality equation There are some targets which are not expressly addressed by the existing rules, ie dual-use facilities (broadcasting stations, economic installations, electric generating facilities, lines of communication, commercial means of transport, etc) and animals. As to the former, it is increasingly difficult to determine the relation of a potential target to the military effort. Civilian activities are more and more militarized, while the military ones are more and more civilianized. Article 52 (2) of Additional Protocol I pays no attention to the civilian function performed by the facility, which is not an element to take into account when establishing whether the object is a military objective. All one could say is that the contribution of the dual-use installation to civilian needs must be carefully considered in the proportionality calculus in order to verify if the damage to the population is excessive or not. 215 An important role might also be played by Article 57 (3) of Additional Protocol I (which is generally considered as reflecting customary law), according to which '[w]hen a choice is possible between several military objectives for obtaining a similar military advantage, the objective to be selected shall be that the attack on which may be expected to cause the least danger to civilian lives and to civilian objects'. Moreover, according to the ICTY, when a rule of humanitarian law is vague, it has to be interpreted in the light of the Martens clause, and therefore 'so as to construe as narrowly as possible the discretionary power to attack belligerents and, by the same token, so as to expand the protection accorded to civilians'.
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However that may be, the Europeans have generally applied the definition of 'military objective' contained in Article 52 (2) of Additional Protocol I, and have therefore considered lawful only attacks on those dual-use targets which make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization offers a definite military advantage in the circumstances ruling at the time. On the contrary, according to the 2002 US Joint Doctrine for Targeting, the military advantage does not have necessarily to be 'definite'. Accordingly, the United States considers lawful the bombing of a broadcasting station even if it is just used for 214 The only exception is the 1977 Additional Protocol I, Art 1 (4) of which takes into account 'armed conflicts which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations'. The Protocol, however, does not provide for specific rules for this kind of conficts, but submit them to the same provisions as those for international ones. 215 See, eg, the 2002 US Joint Doctrine for Targeting at A-4. 216 Kupreškić Judgment above n 20 para 525.
propaganda purposes, regardless of its being part of the military communication system, and also admits the attack on economic facilities which indirectly but effectively support the enemy's warfighting capabilities. Such provisions are not consistent with customary international humanitarian law and represent the ius in bello counterpart of President Bush's unorthodox approach to jus ad bellum.
The most recent armed conflicts also show a trend towards a new concept, the socalled 'effects-based warfare', according to which not all military objectives need to be destroyed. The very definition contained in Article 52 (2) of Additional Protocol I considers not only the destruction of the objective, but also its neutralization, ie 'denying the use of an object to the enemy without necessarily destroying it'. 217 For instance, while the integrated Iraqi electric grid, used both by the military and by civilians, was treated as a military target by the Coalition strategic planners during Operation Desert Storm causing widespread criticism, the US aircraft attacked electric generating installations in Kosovo in such a way as to cause only temporary incapacitation through the use of graphite bombs. As far as we know, in Afghanistan the Coalition did not attack economic objectives (but it has to be recalled that the industrial infrastructure of that country was virtually non-existent), and in Operation Iraqi
Freedom the destruction of economic and electric power facilities was limited to the minimum extent possible. 218 Nevertheless, the new, more cautious approach, far from demonstrating a change in the opinio juris, can be explained in the light of the new American military strategy, aimed at causing maximum impact but minimum damage, in order to preserve infrastructures and so facilitate the reconstruction of the post-war occupied enemies. 
